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TRIPARTITE LABOR DISPUTES IN THE
AIRLINE INDUSTRY
The Railway Labor Act 1
 (RLA), the first successful attempt to establish
machinery to control labor relations in the railroad industry,' also applies
to the airline industry. Under the act, a variety of specialized procedures has
been developed to settle labor disputes in these two industries, which have
been treated separately from other industries because of their intimate con-
nection with interstate commerce.' Congress felt that the prevention of
harmful work stoppages in industries providing interstate transportation of
passengers and freight was crucial to the national well-being. 4 There are, how-
ever, some structural differences in the machinery created by the RLA to
handle labor disputes in the railroad and in the airline industries.° The signifi-
cant difference is the existence of a national, industry-wide railroad board for
handling contract-interpretation disputes, a board which has no single counter-
part in the airline industry.° The absence of such a national board for inter-
preting contracts in the airline industry has resulted in the RLA's inability
to accomplish its purposes in all cases, an inability which has resulted in
several labor disputes leading to work stoppage. The type of dispute which
to date has placed the greatest strain on RLA procedures is the crew-comple-
ment controversy which has raged between the pilots' union and the flight
engineers' union. Each group wants the airplane-cabin crew to include a man
who is trained in its skill. The unions bargain with the carriers for such a
clause and the carriers, under threat of strike, usually include the desired
clause in each union's contract. The presently existing statutory machinery
cannot resolve the resulting three party dispute- adequately. This comment
will consider how and why the present system has failed to provide a method
for settling such airline disputes, the ramifications of this failure for the
airline industry, and what might be done to remedy the situation. To view
this failure in perspective, it is necessary to consider the nature of those
disputes specifically involved and the significance of the differences between
the procedures for settling such disputes under the RLA.
1 45 U.S.C. §l 151-63, 181-88 (1964).
2 Early legislative attempts to control railroad labor problems established voluntary
procedures, and the decisions of the administrative bodies created by such legislation were
merely advisory. For a complete treatment of early railroad labor legislation, see L.
Lecht, Experience Under Railway Labor Legislation (1955) ; Garrison, The National
Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative Agency, 46 Yale L.J. 567 (1937).
3 See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 295 F.2d 209, 215
(5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 372 U.S. 682 (1961).
4 The RLA was enacted with the expressed purpose of "avoidEing3 any interruption
to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein." RLA § 2, 45 U.S.C.
§ 151a (1964).
5 Compare RLA § 3, 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1964), with RLA § 204, 45 U.S.C. § 184
(1964).
8 RLA § 204, 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1964).
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I. CLASSIFICATION OF DISPUTES UNDER RLA
The various disputes the RLA was intended to handle are classified by
the Act into three categories: representational, major, and minor.? Classifica-
tion depends upon the cause of the dispute. 8
 Representational disputes are
those involving two unions, both of which are seeking recognition as the sole
bargaining agent for employees currently holding a position. 9
 When a repre-
sent4ional dispute occurs in either the railroad or airline industry, the
National Mediation Board is authorized by the Act to settle the matter by
investigating the dispute and conducting a secret ballot of the employees
involved. 10
 This procedure is intended conclusively to determine which union
will represent the workers in question."
"Major" disputes are: those arising in the initial negotiation of a
collective-bargaining agreement between a union and a carrier; controversies
over matters not covered by an existing agreement; and disputes involving
attempts to change an existing agreement. 12
 In all "major" disputes the parties
are attempting to acquire new rights and not to enforce existing rights. 19 The
first step in the procedure for handling "major" disputes is private negotiation
between the parties. 14
 -If the dispute remains unresolved, it goes to mediation
under the supervision of the National Mediation Board. 19 If mediation fails,
the Mediation Board endeavors to have the parties submit to voluntary arbi-
tration. 18
 As a last resort, the President may intervene and set up an emer-
gency board to investigate and report on the dispute. The findings of this
emergency board are not binding. The creation of such a board, however, is
accompanied by an automatic cooling-off period. 17 These mediation and arbi-
tration procedures have been created to facilitate agreement without actual
compulsion to settle. When the statutory procedures are unable to resolve
the "major" dispute, a strike usually results; however, during recent railroad
disputes, Congress, because of the importance of the industry to the national
interest, enacted special legislation requiring compulsory settlement of those
disputes. 18
"Minor" disputes are those relating to the interpretation of existing
agreements and grievances arising from the application of these agreements. 19
These disputes involve the assertion of rights accrued under a contract." Be-
7 See id. §§ 2, Ninth, 3, 6, 45 U.S.C. §§ 152, Ninth, 153, 156 (1964). See also 27
National Mediation Board Ann. Rep. 4 (1961).
8
 27 National Mediation Board Ann. Rep. 4 (1961).
9 Id.
10 RLA §§ 2, Ninth, 201, 45 U.S.C. §§ 152, Ninth, 181 (1964).
11 Id.
12 Elgin 5. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945), aff'd on rehearing, 327
U.S. 661 (1946).
13 Id.
14 RLA § 2, Second, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Second (1964).
5, First, 45 U.S.C. § 155, First.
1150 Id.
17 Id. § 10, 45 U.S.C. § 160. The cooling-off period is a thirty-day interim during
which neither party may make any change in the situation. Id.
18 Pub. L. No. 88-108, 77 Stat. 132 (1963).
19 Elgin J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945).
20 Id.
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cause of the great number of such disturbances and their relatively minor
character, the RLA provided machinery to settle "minor" disputes which is
far different from that provided for "major" disputes." 21 Private negotiation
between the parties is the first step toward resolution of minor disputes. 22 If
such negotiation fails, either party, or both, may apply to an adjustment
board, on which the union and the carrier are equally represented, to resolve
the dispute. 23 This board holds a hearing and attempts to resolve the dispute
by vote; however, the even distribution in board membership between labor
and management frequently causes deadlocks. 24 In case of such a deadlock,
the board members choose , a neutral party as "referee." If they cannot agree
to one, the National Mediation Board is empowered to appoint a neutral
referee to the board so that the dispute will finally be resolved. 25 These adjust-
ment board procedures were intended by Congress to resolve all "minor"
disputes without strikes, thus limiting the use of strikes to "major" disputes. 26
This procedure for settling "minor" disputes has worked well for the
settlement of most such disputes. 27 The important exception, however, has
been tripartite disputes over work assignment—disputes in which more than
one union is seeking to have its existing membership selected to fill a position
or group of positions.28
II. TRIPARTITE WORK-ASSIGMENT DISPUTES UNDER RLA
The work-assignment dispute is a recent development in labor relations.
The most frequent cause of a work-assignment dispute is replacement of
workers caused by technological change. As multioperation machines are devel-
oped which are able to perform, in one operation, functions previously accom-
plished in two operations by members of different unions, only one job may
remain where previously there had been two. 29 When this occurs, the unions
which previously represented workers in their separate positions may be
21 At the time of passage of the act, the number of "minor" disputes, those involving
contract interpretations and grievances, had reached major proportions, and a railroad
crisis was imminent. The RLA procedures were created to resolve these disputes and,
at the same time, to get "minor" disputes out of the way of the settling of "major"
disputes by the Mediation Board. Id. at 726.
22 RLA § 2, Second, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Second (1964).
28 Id. §§ 3, First (a), (i), 204, 45 U.S.C. §§ 153, (a), (i), 184.
24 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 8.11, at 562 (1958).
25 RLA § 3, First (1), 45	 § 153, First (1) (1964).
28 See Elgin J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 726 n.22 (1945).
27 See 27 National Mediation Board Ann. Rep. 86 (1961).
28 Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 263-66 (1964). These disputes
have been called jurisdictional disputes because the extent of the authority of two unions
is involved, but should not be confused with representational disputes which are also
categorized as jurisdictional. Although both types of disputes are referred to by the
same terminology, work-assignment disputes involve two conflicting union claims against
the employer (tripartite), while representational disputes involve a direct conflict between
two unions, and any effect on the employer is incidental.
213 See Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pac. R.R., 385
U.S. 157 (1966). Infrequently, work-assignment disputes are caused by unions seeking to
increase the number of jobs available to their members at the expense of another union.
This conflict between unions may take a variety of forms, such as a dispute over the
qualifications for a position, but the instigating union's purpose is usually to increase
employment opportunities for its members.
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placed into conflict over whose members will fill the single remaining positions,
especially when the number of jobs created by the new machine does not
absorb all the displaced workers. The continued rapid expansion in the airline
industry, a characteristic of a new industry, created such high demand for
personnel that it more than compensated for employment reductions caused
by technological advances. 30 As the industry approaches its optimum size,
although the number of persons employed continues to increase, the employ-
ment growth rate is slowing down. This has resulted from reduction in em-
ployment requirements caused by advancing technology, the effect of which
has not been completely compensated for by the continued expansion of the
industry." The effects of technology upon employment are much less evident
in the airline industry than they are in the older railroad industry, where
technological advances have been the major factor in the reduction of the
size of the work force by half since 1947. 32 Since the RLA was drafted many
years before the effects of technological advances became pronounced, there
was no provision in the statute for the three-party work-assignment disputes
which are often caused by such advances. Instead, the RLA procedures were
all written in terms of two-party disputes. 33
Despite the lack of specific provisions in the RLA, a definite proce-
dure has been established for railroad work-assignment disputes through
an evolution in the interpretation of the statute by the courts. Since work-
assignment disputes involve contract rights and are therefore classified as
"minor," the courts have forced the adjustment boards to be the vehicles
for the statutory evolution. In the railroad industry, the adjustment board is
a single body, national in scope, with membership on the board selected by all
the carriers and national unions. 34 In spite of a rather inauspicious beginning,
the evolution of the National Railroad Adjustment Board's functions in the
area of work-assignment disputes has brought the Board to the point where it
is now required to resolve such disputes between the three parties. 23
The RLA provides that all "involoved" parties to a dispute must receive
notice of the adjustment board proceeding. 3 a The notice requirement was
written into the law in order to protect the interests of all parties who might
be affected by a given hearing 37 and to avoid a multiplicity of hearings arising
out of the same situation. The unions felt, however, that the interests of their
30 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Technological Trends in Major American Industries
219 (1966).
31 "Between 1947 and 1957, employment in air transportation grew at a compounded
average annual rate of 6.2 percent, rising from 82,000 workers to over 148,000. In
the 1957-64 period, the growth rate slowed to 3.7 percent annually, reflecting the impact
of advancing technology." Id.
32 Id. at 202.
33 E.g., RLA §§ 7, Second (a), 201, 45 U.S.C. §§ 157, Second (a), 181 (1964).
34 Id. § 3, First (a), 45 U.S.C. § 153, First (a).
35 Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pac. R.R., 385 U.S.
157, 165 (1966).
so RLA § 3, First (j), 45 U.S.C. § 153, First (j) (1964).
37 Townsend v. NLRB, 117 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. III. 1954). One of the original pur-
poses of the notice requirement was to benefit individual employees in disputes over
such matters as seniority. See Estes v. Union Terminal Co., 89 F.2d 768 (5th Cir.
1937).
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members were better served if they did not participate in. a tripartite hearing.
Each union preferred to take its contract to the National Railroad Adjustment
Board for an individual determination of whether, by the contract terms, the
union should be entitled to the position. When both unions independently
followed this course of action, it often resulted in separate determinations
that each union was entitled to the same position." Such results place the
carrier in the awkward position of having to compensate two groups of em-
ployees for the same work.
The unions were able to accomplish this result because of the Board's
composition and procedures. When one union presented its part of a work-
assignment dispute, the carrier involved would petition for joinder or for
notice to the other union involved. A vote would be taken on this petition,
and the board would deadlock, all union members voting against joinder or
notice and all carriers voting in favor." As a result of the tie vote, the motion
would be defeated." Such tactics were successful in thwarting the carrier's
attempts to adjudicate the entire dispute in one proceeding. As a result of the
futility inherent in the use of this procedure in the early work-assignment
cases, the Board did not even provide notice to both unions.41 This failure of
the Railroad Adjustment Board adequately to handle tripartite disputes left
any possibility for change in the hands of the courts.
The courts did not approve of the Board's failure to give notice in work-
assignment cases. In Hunter v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry.,42 the court chastised
the Board for its consistent failure to give notice to the second union involved
in a dispute. Other courts refused to enforce Board awards made without such
notice." Faced with this hostility towards its handling of work-assignment
disputes, the Board modified its position and began to give notice to the
second -union. This notice alone proved insufficient to remedy the situation,
for the union which received notice would send back a form reply disavowing
any interest and declining to participate."
89 Under the terms of the contracts between the unions and the carrier, each union
was entitled to the position, The Adjustment Board looked at each contract separately
to determine the rights of the parties. With such a procedure, one contract would have
no bearing on the rights of the parties under the other contract. Transportation-
Communication Employees Union v. Union Pac. R.R., 385 U.S. 157, 160 (1966).
39 Northrup & Kahn, Railroad Grievance Machinery: A Critical Analysis, 5 Ind. &
Lab. Rel. Rev. 365, 373 (1952). The other union would assent to the procedure and
later bring a separate claim under its own contract with the carrier. In this second
proceeding, the earlier decision would have no effect since the rights of the second union
had not been involved.
49 The neutral referee could not vote on procedural matters. See Illinois Cent. R.A.
v. Whitehouse, 212 F.2d 22, 27 (7th Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 349 U.S. 366
(1955).
41 See Whitehouse v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 349 U.S. 366, 372 (1955).
42 188 F.2d 294 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 819 (1951). "To say that members
[of one union] are not involved in a dispute which may result in [members of the
second union] supplanting them in their jobs is so unrealistic as to be absurd." Id. at
300-01.
43 E.g., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. New Orleans T. & M. Ry., 229 F.2d 59 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 997 (1956).
44 This form reply was drafted by the Railway Labor Executives Association,
which is composed of the leaders of various railway labor unions.
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The Supreme Court finally resolved the entire matter by requiring that
the Railroad Adjustment Board must not only give notice, but must resolve
the tripartite dispute in one proceeding." Furthermore, the Court held that
the decision of the Railroad Adjustment Board was final regardless of whether
the second union chose to participate." By requiring the Board to adjudicate
work-assignment disputes in one proceeding, the Court forced it to function
in the same way that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) functions
when faced with a similar problem, that is, by holding a hearing and then
either awarding the position to one of the unions or splitting the positions
between the unions. 47
 This gradual development under the Railway Labor
Act is consistent with the statutory purpose of preventing interruption to
commerce, since it resolves work-assignment disputes without strikes.
In the airline industry, this evolution of adjustment board powers has
not taken place. This is due to the difference between the composition of ad-
justment boards in that industry and the National Board which exists in the
railroad industry. Unlike the railroad industry's single board, the airline indus-
try has many adjustment boards, each created by the contract between a
carrier and a single union. 48
 A tripartite dispute cannot be decided by such a
single-union board because one union comprises half of the board's member-
ship, while the other union is not represented at all." The Supreme Court
decision on tripartite disputes in the railroad industry, requiring the National
Railroad Adjustment Board to resolve the tripartite dispute in one proceeding
can have little bearing on airline problems of the same nature because the
single-union board is designed to handle only disputes between the single
union and the employer. The absence of any airline adjustment board with
more than one union represented means that there is no forum to resolve tri-
partite disputes in the airline industry.
The National Railroad Adjustment Board facilities are not applicable to
the airline industry due to a provision of the RLA which specifically refuses
to give it such jurisdiction. 50 Moreover, the NLRB, which resolves work-
assignment disputes for other industries, 51
 has no authority to settle disputes in
the airline industry. 52
 Even the courts have refused to decide work-assignment
disputes, claiming that congressional passage of the RLA to deal with labor
45
 Transportation-Communication Employees Union v. Union Pac. R.R., 385 U.S.
157 (1966).
46
 Id. The Court held the form letter which the union had sent would not prevent
an adjudication of its rights at the hearing.
47
 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1964). The NLRB has power to decide a work-assignment
dispute when the regional director has reason to believe that a union is attempting to
induce a strike in order to compel assignment of the work to its members. Daykin,
Jurisdictional Disputes Under the NLRB, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 597, 602 (1956). In
contrast, under the RLA, one of the parties must petition the Railroad Adjustment
Board before it has authority to act. RLA § 3, First (i), 45 U.S.C. § 153, First (i) (1964).
48 RLA § 204, 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1964).
49
 Letter from an airline executive, Oct. 12, 1967.
50 See RLA § 201, 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1964), where the provisions of the railway
act are made applicable to the airline industry with the exception of § 3, 45 U.S.C. § 153,
which establishes a National Railroad Adjustment Board.
51 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1964).
52 Id. § 182.
463
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
disputes has removed such matters from judicial determination. 53 The result
for the airline industry has been a complete inability to cope with tripartite
disputes, disputes which are readily settled in all other industries.
The inability of the single-union adjustment board to resolve tripartite
airline disputes has been most apparent in connection with the crew-comple-
ment controversy between the Pilots Association and the Flight Engineers
Association. During the past decade, crew-complement disputes in their vari-
ous forms have produced 13 airline strikes totaling 510 days lost." In 1961,
when these disputes shut down eight airlines, they accounted for 42 percent
of the work days lost due to strikes in the airline industry. 55 Crew-complement
disputes are those concerning the selection and the qualifications of the third
person in the airplane cabin. The pilots wanted the man to be a pilot-qualified
engineer; the flight engineers wanted a mechanic-qualified engineer. i° Each
union sought to include provisions to achieve its end in its collective-bargain-
ing agreement. Because airline unions held a strong bargaining position in
contract negotiations due to the service nature of the industry, a factor
which prevented the stockpiling of goods," the carrier, in order to prevent a
strike which would result in a complete loss of income usually assented to the
inclusion of the desired clause. If both unions used this tactic, the carrier was
faced with two conflicting claims for the particular job, each supported by a
contract provision. When the carrier decided on the qualifications for the
position, a decision which necessarily violated the contract of one of the two
unions, the aggrieved union brought the disputed contract provisions to its
contractually created adjustment board. The adjustment board interpreted
the express lanuage of the contract without regard to extrinsic evidence, such
as the other union's contract. If successful before the adjustment board, the
union would seek court enforcement.
Court enforcement of adjustment board decisions was generally quite
difficult. The courts have felt that the awards, made without consideration of
the second union's position, were unfair to that union and could not be
enforced to the second union's detriment." The courts, however, have been
unable to remedy the situation by readjudication of the issues because a recent
amendment of the RLA makes the board's findings conclusive between the
58 E.g., Flight Eng'rs Int'l Ass'n v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 311 F.2d 745 (2d Cir.
1963). This judicial position was also applied to railroad disputes before board resolution
was made mandatory. Slocum v. Delaware L. & W.R.R., 339 U.S. 239, 244 (1950).
54 Statement by Everett M. Goulard before the Special Committee on National
Strikes in the Transportation Industries of the American Bar Association 27 (May 5,
1967).
55 See 27 National Mediation Board Ann. Rep. 85 (1961).
Henzey, Labor Problems in the Airline Industry, 25 Law & Contemp. Prob. 43,
46-47 (1960). The pilots union based its claim upon the necessity of pilot training for
everyone in the cabin to enable anyone to operate the airplane should the need arise.
The flight engineers felt this was a cover for a work-assignment dispute, that the
pilots union wanted to fill the position with their pilot-trained members, and feared
that this was the first step toward an eventual takeover by the larger pilots union. See
Blum, Fourth Man Out—Background of the Flight Engineer—Airline Pilot Conflict, 13
Labor L.J. 649, 651 (1962).
sr Goulard, supra note 54, at 17.
58 E.g., Ruby v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 393 (S.D,N.Y. 1966).
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parties59
 and allows the reviewing court only to choose between accepting the
board's decision, setting it aside or remanding." Thus the courts are not able
to achieve a fair solution for all the parties, and the RLA remains ineffective
to cope with airline work-assignment disputes.
SOME ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES
There are several possible methods by which the present procedures for
handling work-assignment disputes could be improved. Although each possi-
bility offers a considerable number of advantages over the present system, each
has such serious drawbacks as to make both unions and carriers reluctant to
change from the present system. Since the RLA does not provide for solution
of tripartite airline disputes, any solution must be accomplished through pri-
vate agreement of the parties or by changing the machinery of the act.
Voluntary arbitration could be used to resolve work-assignment disputes
and at the same time avoid many of the difficulties accompanying the Railroad
Adjustment Board procedures 6 1
 This tripartite arbitration might be accom-
plished by having each party select an arbitration representative, and then
allowing these reprensentatives to operate as a special adjustment board with
regular adjustment board procedures.
The unions and carriers will not assent to such a solution, however,
because a combination of any two of the parties could defeat the interests of
the third. If the carrier sides with one of the unions, the carrier would be
insulated from incurring double liability, a result which the unions feel is
unfair because the carrier agreed to each contract and thereby gained bar-
gaining advantages when the contract was negotiated. Conversely, the carrier
fears the unions may collaborate and decide that the contract provision in
each union's agreement is valid, thus requiring the carrier to pay two workers
for one job 62 For these reasons it is unlikely that arbitration will serve as a
solution. Alternately, attempts at private mediation between the parties have
been made in the past with little success, 63 since there can be no solution
acceptable to all the parties to a dispute. Thus, in spite of the continued availa-
bility of voluntary solution to work-assignment disputes, it has seldom been
successfully' used.
Since voluntary solution to this problem is unlikely, some change in the
5° RLA §§ 3, First (p), (q), 45 U.S.C. §§ 153, First (p), (q) (Supp. II 1965-66),
The procedural aspects of this section have been held to he applicable to airline dis-
putes. Gordon v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 210 (W.D. Va. 1967).
6° RLA §§ 3, First (p), (q), 45 U.S.C. §§ 153, First (p), (q) (Supp. II 1965-66).
The courts' power to remand or set aside the order or award of the Adjustment Board
is limited to situations in which there is a failure of the division to comply with the
statute, an exercise of Board power in excess of jurisdiction, or for fraud or corruption
of a division member. Id.
61 Some of the difficulties for railroads have involved conflicts over which division
of the National Railroad Adjustment Board will decide a particular dispute. In cases
where the unions belong to different divisions, selection of the division to bear the
dispute will be determinative. Other problems with RLA tripartite railroad procedure
involve unions which are not national in scope or which are national but not personally
represented by a member on the board.
62 Henzey, supra note 56, at 46.
66 Goulard, supra note 54, at 26.
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procedural machinery appears to be necessary. The change which would be
least difficult to effect has been provided by the Act itself, 64
 for the National
Mediation Board may, when it deems necessary, establish a permanent Na-
tional Air Transport Adjustment Board, which would have the same authority
and powers as the National Railroad Adjustment Board.° 5 The Air Transport
Adjustment Board would consist of an equal number of representatives chosen
by both the air carriers and the national unions." With each union taking
part in the selection of board members, the problem incurred by the present,
single-union adjustment boards in resolving multiparty disputes would be
eliminated. To date the Mediation Board has felt neither a need nor a demand
for the establishment of an Air Transport Adjustment Board. 87 The Mediation
Board has felt that such an adjustment board is unnecessary because of the
effectiveness of existing airline adjustment boards, which except for work-
assignment disputes have worked well." Both the unions and the carriers are
also generally pleased with the way adjustment boards have handled "minor"
disputes.09 In addition, until the recent Supreme Court decision requiring
resolution of railroad work-assignment disputes in a single proceeding, there
was no reason for the Mediation Board to believe that an Air Transport
Adjustment Board could function any more effectively than did the National
Railroad Adjustment Board when dealing with such disputes. In light of this
decision, however, an Air Transport Adjustment Board should be able to
resolve tripartite airline disputes.
When the RLA was first made applicable to the airline industry, only the
pilots were formally organized. 7° Under those conditions, where there was little
national union organization, a National Air Transport Adjustment Board, as
allowed by the present statute, would have been absurd. For this reason, when
Congress extended the RLA in 1936 to include the airline industry, it must
have felt it inappropriate to apply the same adjustment-board structure that
it had created for the railroad industry, in which the labor unions were already
organized,74 to the airline industry. Thus the provision creating a national
adjustment board for the railroad industry was omitted for the airline indus-
try.72 At present, although the number of unions in the airline industry is
64 RLA § 205, 45 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
65 id.
66 There is a difference in the number of members between the railroad and airline
national boards. While the National Railroad Adjustment Board has 36 members, the
National Air Transport Adjustment Board would have only four members, two selected
by the carriers and two by the national unions. Id.
67 National Mediation Board, Administration of the Railway Labor Act by the
National Mediation Board 1934-1957, at 29 (1958).
68 Letter from Howard G. Gamser, Chairman, National Mediation Board, Oct. 6,
1967.
go Id.
70 Henzey, supra note 56, at 44.
71 In the railroad industry, the nationalization and centralization of unions occurred
during World War I, before the RLA was enacted. This early organization facilitated
the creation of the National Railroad Adjustment Board. See Garrison, The National
Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative Agency, 46 Yale L.J. 567, 570
(1937).
72 See authorities cited note 50 supra.
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relatively small, the labor organization of the airline industry is conducive to
a national board.
Many disadvantages would accompany the formation of a National Air
Transport Adjustment Board. Such a board would take over the functions
now performed by the decentralized airline adjustment boards and incorporate
many of the flaws inherent in the centralized National Railroad Adjustment
Board. Perhaps the foremost flaw which would be incorporated is the delay
factor inherent in referring all "minor" disputes to a single administrative body.
Much of the benefit in having many airline adjustment boards has been their
speed in resolving disputes on those matters,
 where they have been able to
function. Long delays before a hearing by these single-union boards are un-
likely because their jurisdiction is limited to disputes between one union
and one carrier. With the replacement of these many boards by a single
national board, a backlog of cases is almost certain to result.
In the railroad industry, the National Railroad Adjustment Board has
been faced with so many disputes that long delays occur before any hearing
can be held. This delay problem in the railroad industry has led to amendment
of the RLA to allow railroad unions faced with Railroad Adjustment Board
delays to compel the carrier to create special adjustment boards to lessen the
National Board's workload.73 Prior to this amendment mutual consent was
needed to create such a special board," and the carriers felt a delay was to
their advantage. In the airline industry, if the National Air Transport Ad-
justment Board were created, either party to the existing two-party board
might prevent continuation of that board by electing to come under the juris-
diction of the National Board.75 This RLA provision would lead to delays in
the airline industry which the recently adopted amendments were intended to
prevent in the railroad industry. 70 Since the airline industry provisions were
left intact, the railroad amendment will have no effect on lessening the Air
Transport Adjustment Board workload if such a board is created.
Furthermore, the National Air Transport Adjustment Board, like the
Railroad Adjustment Board, would be unable to deal with the problems cre-
ated by a dispute involving a union which is not national in scope. Although
these unions may bring disputes before the National Board, they are unwilling
to do so because they do not take part in the selection of Board members.
They feel that submission of a dispute to a board on which only the carriers
and national unions is represented would be disadvantageous to their posi-
tion.77 For this reason, local unions have avoided submitting disputes to a
national adjustment board.
Although the airline industry's present boards have worked well for one-
union disputes, the work-assignment problem is grave enough to require struc-
tural changes. A possible compromise between the status quo and a national
RLA § 3, Second, 45 U.S.C. § 153, Second (Supp. II 1965-66).
74 Act of June 21, 1934, ch. 691, § 3, Second, 48 Stat. 1189.
75 RLA § 205, 45 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
70 Compare RLA § 3, Second, 45 U.S.C. § 153, Second (Supp. II 1965-66), with
RLA § 205, 45 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
77 These local unions have often been involved in jurisdictional conflicts with the
national unions, and fear that the national unions' board members would not be
sympathetic to their claim.
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adjustment board might be reached by limiting that board's jurisdiction to
tripartite disputes, thereby retaining the present structure for all other dis-
putes. This type of modification, however, requires legislation to give it effect,
while an Air Transport Adjustment Board with complete jurisdiction requires
no new legislation.78
 Such a change also fails to eliminate problems created
by disputes involving unions less than national in scope.
Another possible solution to the problem of tripartite airline disputes
would be to place airlines under the authority of the NLRB by making the
Railway Labor Act inapplicable to the airline industry. The NLRB resolves
work-assignment disputes by deciding which party is entitled to the position
without allowing either party to strike over this type of dispute." Compulsory
settlement by the NLRB is commonly used in other industries, 8° and there is
no reason to believe that application of NLRB procedures to the airline indus-
try could not resolve its work-assignment disputes.81
 Under the NLRB, how-
ever, there are no procedures for compulsory settlement of two-party "minor"
disputes, and such disputes often cause strikes in NLRB industries. Placing
the airline industry under the NLRB would remove RLA compulsion, and a
strike over any "minor" dispute could occur, with resulting serious effect on
commerce. For this reason, in spite of the desirability of having work-assign-
ment disputes resolved by the NLRB, the over-all effect of shifting supervision
of labor relations in the airline industry to the NLRB would not be in the best
interests of commerce. All the alternatives suggested would help to alleviate
the problems involved with work-assignment disputes, yet each would, by its
very nature sacrifice valuable assets of present RLA procedure. Resolution of
this impasse could be reached by absorbing, through amendment, the more
desireable features of the various alternatives into the RLA structure.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since NLRB procedures have been so effective in handling work-assign-
ment disputes, it is submitted that incorporation of similar work-assignment
provisions into the RLA structure for the airline industry would be the most
effective solution to work-assignment disputes. By incorporation of this pro-
vision, solution of tripartite airline conflicts could be compelled, and the
compulsory settlement provisions of the RLA for other "minor" disputes could
be retained. Avoidance of adjustment board delay would demand assignment
of the decision-making machinery for tripartite disputes to an impartial board
for resolution. The National Mediation Board seems to be the agency best
equipped to resolve tripartite disputes. First, it is already in operation and
has authority to resolve multi-union disputes when they involve representa-
tional issues. Second, it has the expertise to deal with specialized airline prob-
lems which would be lost if the NLRB were used. The membership of the
Mediation Board is similar to that of the NLRB, since both boards are ap-
pointed by the President and not by the parties involved in the dispute. With
TB RLA § 205, 45 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
79 See note 47 supra.
80 Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 265 (1964).
81 See Maclntyre, The Railway Labor Act—A Misfit for the Airlines, 19 J. Air L.
& Com. 274, 288 (1952).
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this composition, the board members would not be acting out of self-interest in
making their decisions.
Furthermore, since the members of the Mediation Board are not selected
by any involved party, the Board could resolve tripartite disputes involving
unions not national in scope. Any objection by the Mediation Board to this
increase in its workload could easily be overcome by increasing the size of its
staff, since the RLA provides that the Board may assign some of its work to
single members or to employees. 82
 If more desirable, additional members may
be added. Use of the Mediation Board will thus eliminate many of the diffi-
culties encountered by railroads in using the Railroad Adjustment Board, and
at the same time will fulfill the purpose of the RLA by resolving all tripartite
airline disputes.
WILLIAM B. SNEIRSON
82
 RLA § 4, Fourth, 45 U.S.C. § 154, Fourth (1964).
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